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It is a little over 200 years since Isaac Burr and Timothy
Phelps executed two deeds which made law for Connecticut. On
January 18th, 1726, Burr conveyed an undivided one-half inter-
est in certain lands to Sarah and Hannah Burr, the other half
interest being similarly deeded by Phelps, and both deeds being
in form sufficient at common law to create a joint tenancy.
Sarah died, some 25 years later, devising her interest in the land
to Isaac Burr, Jr., through whose insolvent and intestate estate
the interest came to Dr. Sylvester Gardner and through him to
one Jepson. Hannah Burr, having survived Sarah, sold her in-
terest in the land, by deed of bargain and sale, to one Phelps,
on August 24th, 1758. Phelps brought an action of ejectment
against Jepson, some years later, his counsel evidently relying
on the then newly published discourse of Sir William Blackstone
in reaching the conclusion that the entire estate became Hannah's
upon the decease of Sarah. The cause came before the Super-
ior Court-then a court whose decisions were of binding author-
ity in Connecticut-at Hartford County in 1769. For reasons
not since preserved, that court decided that survivorship, under
the common law of Connecticut, was not an incident of joint
tenancy, and judgment was rendered accordingly for the defend-
ant.,
Writing in 1795, Zephaniah Swift, the Blackstone of Connecti-
cut, evidently relied on this case, at least in part, when he said:
"In England on the death of either of the joint-tenants, his right
remains, and goes to the surviving tenants. But in this State
we have never adopted this odious and unjust doctrine of sur-
vivorship, but on the decease of one of the joint-tenants, his
share descends to his heirs." 2
Thirty-odd years later, with a more mellow experience which
included several years as Justice and Chief Justice of the Con-
necticut Supreme Court of Errors, the same writer, with a bit
more tolerance in his attitude, said:
"... . if one [joint tenant] dies, his right does not descend to his
heirs, but survives to the other, which is called the jus accrcs-
I Phelps v. Jepson, 1 Root 48 (Conn. 1769).
2 1 SwuT, SYSTEmi (1795) 272.
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cendi, or right of survivorship, which was never recognized in
this State." 3
Wherein Swift found the doctrine of survivorship "odious"
and "unjust" is not clear. He contents himself with the state-
ment quoted, without further elaboration. It is probable, how-
ever, that he was led into such language by the ease with which,
at common law, an estate was construed to be a joint tenancy,
contrary, in all likelihood, to the real intent of the grantees of
such estates, who in many cases had apparently advanced equal
consideration in expectation of receiving equal estates, equally
descendible to their own heirs. Thus, in the majority of cases
in which the joint tenants were unrelated by blood, marriage, or
affinity, an injustice was worked, odious alike to the heirs of the
first deceased joint tenant and to the original grantees them-
selves.
None of the cases give any intimation that public policy would
frown on a common-law joint tenancy if created by such means
as fully to apprise the tenants of the real incidents and rights
involved. Indeed, in one case it was said:
"It is undoubted that a joint tenancy, or tenancy for life, can
be created with remainder over to the surviving tenant." 4
The cases have simply stated the fact that Connecticut law does
not recognize the incident of survivorship, and have quoted
Phelps v. Jepson as their authority. In certain relationships
and under proper circumstances, however, the rights and inci-
dents of a common-law joint tenancy appear highly desirable."The modern attempt to evade the decision in Phelps v. Jepson
is evinced by the ever-increasing number of the so-called "sur-
vivorship deeds" which find their way to the record books in the
town clerks' offices in Connecticut, showing that to many persons
the doctrine of survivorship is not "odious and unjust." Such
a deed, for a consideration received of two persons, passes the
estate to the grantees "and the survivor of them, and to such
survivor's heirs and assigns," or, in the case of more than two
grantees, to the grantees "and the survivors and survivor of
them, and to such survivor's heirs and assigns," with similar
language in the habendum. In some localities, it is safe to say,
the majority of deeds to a husband and wife are made in the
survivorship form. There are many such deeds, also, to grantees
bearing some close relationship, such as brother and sister.
Only infrequently, however, do such deeds appear to grantees
who are not so related.
It is a remarkable fact that this form of deed, although now
3 1 SWIFT, DIGEST (Dutton's Rev. 1874) side page 102.
-Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630, 637, 86 At]. 664, 667 (1913).
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in such very extensive use, and involving as it does such un-
certainty in the rights of the parties, has never come before the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors for interpretation, and
very seldom before the courts of last resort in other states.
There is apparently no case in any jurisdiction which fully
discusses the rights and liabilities arising out of such a deed,
and practicing lawyers-to judge by their acts-have given little
thought thereto.
In the only Connecticut case 3 which throws any light on the
actual construction of such a deed, land had been conveyed to a
husband, on condition that he survive his wife; and in the same
deed, the land was conveyed to the wife, on condition that she
survive her husband. There was no immediate grant of an un-
conditional present estate, but the court construed the deed so as
to give it what the court conceived to have been the intended
effect, and so read into it an estate in the husband and wife
for their joint lives, with contingent remainder to the survivor
of them. The length to which the court went in fulfilling the
intent of the parties is significant; for it is not usual for courts
to create an estate, as they there created the life estate, out of
a presumed mental condition, unexpressed in the written deed.
In the usual survivorship deed the consideration is stated to
be received from both grantees. The chance of any trust result-
ing to the heirs of the grantee first dying is too remote to merit
lengthy discussion. Such a trust would defeat the very purpose
of the deed. Added to the difficulty of stating the receipt of the
consideration in any other way than from both grantees, so as
to conform to and co-extend with the estates granted, there is
the obvious fact that such a trust is far removed from the intent
of the palties paying for and receiving the deed. Resulting
trusts having originated out of the courts presuming the inten-
tion of the parties7 and the intention here being so clearly to
the contrary, there is scant argument in favor of any such
theory.
The grant is to "John Doe and Richard Roe and to the sur-
vivor of them, and to such survivor's heirs and assigns." Our
elementary textwriters, our ancient and modern cases, and our
classic commentators, all agree on two points: (1) that the word
"heirs" is indispensable to the creation at common law of an
estate in fee simple in a natural person in his own right,8 being
irreplaceable by such words as "issue" or "in fee simple;" (2)
5 Bartholomew v. Muzzy, 61 Conn. 3M7, 23 Atl. C04 (1892).
6We shall hereafter treat only of the deeds to two grantees, the prin-
ciples involved being the same, regardless of the number.
Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 22 Atl. 149 (1890).
See Chamberlain v. Thompson, 10 Conn. 243 (1834); Loomis v. Heub-
lein, 91 Conn. 146, 150, 99 Atl. 483, 484 (1916).
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that the grant of an estate, without defining its quantity, will
convey an estate for the life of the grantee, provided the grantor
was capable of conveying such interest."
We apply these rules, in inverse order. The grant is to Doe
and Roe, without words of limitation to either, eo nomine. Un-
less we can find something to the contrary in the subsequent
language of the deed, the two grantees have each been granted
an estate for life.
There is no doubt that the grantor has divested himself of
his entire interest, for we find the requisite words of inheritance,
applied however to an unnamed, unascertained person-"such
survivor." The grantee of the fee simple is not to be determined
at once: only when one grantee has died. It is a fee simple
granted after a life estate, to a person until then unascertained:
a clear case of a contingent remainder, of the first class enumer-
ated by the classic Fearne.
The examination of the wording of the deed has thus given us
a joint life estate, with contingent remainder over to the sur-
vivor-a conclusion reached by the courts of the few states which
have considered the question 10 as well as by Swift." Indeed,
a dictum of the Connecticut court is to this effect.1"
9 1 Swift, op. cit. supra note 3, at side page 83: "The most usual method
for creating estates for life, is by lease: but they may be created not only
by express words, but by a general grant without specifying any estate,
or heirs: this makes him tenant for life; for as no words of inheritance
are inserted in the deed, it can not be construed to be a'fee: but the estate
shall be construed to be as large as the words in the deed will warrant,
and therefore if the grantor have authority to make such a grant, it shall
be construed to be an estate for the life of the grantee."
lOArnold v. Jack's Ex'rs, 24 Pa. 57 (1854), where a devise to three
brothers "as joint tenants, and to the survivors and survivor of them, and
the heirs of said survivor" was construed to be an estate for their joint
lives, with cross-remainder in fee to the survivor. Although survivorship
as an incident of joint tenancy was abolished by statute in 1812, it was hold
that it was still possible to create survivorship by express provisions in
a deed or will. A similar result was reached in Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill.
65, 24 N. E. 553 (1890), where a similar statute was involved, the decision
being based on the intent of the parties. Cf. also Lewis v. Baldwin, 11
Ohio 352 (1842); Ewing's heirs v. Savary, 6 Ky. 235 (1813); Schulz v.
Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N. W. 1012 (1898); and especially Finch v.
Haynes, 144 Mich. 352, 107 N. W. 110 (1906), where our exact conclusion
was reached.
11 "If A. and B. are tenants for their joint lives, remainder to the survivor
in fee, here, though during their joint lives a remainder is vested in neither,
yet, on the death of either, the remainder instantly vests in the survivor."
1 SwIrT, op. cit. supra note 3, at side page 96.
I2 "Where survivorship as an incident to joint tenancy is recognized ...
it is unnecessary to say that the devise is to the two and the survivor of
them. Indeed, if a fee is thus given to two and to the survivor of them,
it is held that a joint tenancy of freehold for their joint lives is created,
with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor... This gives effect
to the words 'to the survivor of them,' which otherwise would be sur-
plusage." Houghton v. Brantingham, supra note 4, at 637, 86 At]. at 667.
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But we still are a long way from defining the rights of the
grantees.
The chief difficulty has been to decide upon the transferability
of such a contingent remainder. This aspect of the deed has
received little consideration from lawyers who use it. Recently
a lawyer accepted a quitclaim deed from one tenant in survivor-
ship, thinking that he thereby became a tenant in common with
the other party; but the Title Company declined to certify to his
title, on the ground that the deed had carried only an estate per
auter vie, the assignability of the remainder being doubtful.
We quote from an early Kentucky case in which a survivor-
ship deed was ably discussed and construed to convey a joint
life estate with contingent remainder to the survivor:
"It is evident, under this grant, neither of the grantees, dur-
ing the life of the other, could by bargain and sale convey more
than a moiety of the land for life. It was necessary, therefore,
for the plaintiff, in order to shew that the conveyance to him
from Vanuxam transferred the entire estate in fee, to prove that
Lambert had died prior to the execution of the conveyance." 13
In Connecticut, a testator once gave to his granddaughter an
estate in fee tail, with devise over, upon her death without issue,
to his daughter-in-law, the mother of the girl. The mother gave
her daughter a quitclaim deed to the property. But the mother,
upon the decease of the girl without issue, laid claim to the land.
It was held that the mother's interest was a contingent re-
mainder to a person certain on an event uncertain; that the
estate was inalienable to a stranger, but could be released to the
tenant-in-tail in possession. The court said:
"... it must be conceded that by the rules of the common
law, it [a contingent remainder] cannot be conveyed or trans-
ferred, by a deed of bargain and sale, or of feoffment, or other
common law assurance, without covenants of warranty, to a
stranger to the estate." 14
Those of us who forget that the Connecticut Supreme Court
of Errors, less than a year ago, did not disdain to quote from
Kirby ' will note the date of this case and will make the sweep-
ing, although empirical, statement that this common-law inhibi-
tion of the transfer of contingent remainders is a thing of the
past: an antiquated doctrine which disappeared into oblivion
along with livery of seisin, and the oneness of husband and wife.
But let us examine the theory of the survivorship deed, and the
later cases in Connecticut and elsewhere.
13 Ewing's heirs v. Savary, supra note 10, at 238.
14 Smith v. Pendell, 19 Conn. 106, 112 (1848); see also Bartholomew v.
Muzzy, supra note 5, at 395, 23 Atl. at 607.
'5 The oldest volume of reported cases in the United States.
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Allen v. Almy i seems, at first, an authority in favor of such
a change in the common law, which has not been altered by stat-
ute in Connecticut. There a devise was made in trust for F for
life, remainder to his children, if any; otherwise to testator's
remaining heirs. It was held that the limitation over to the
heirs created in them "a vested interest in the sense that it was
alienable and transmissible by inheritance. It does not militate
against this result that the vesting in enjoyment was postponed
to some uncertain and future time, or that such vesting might
be entirely defeated by the happening of the event that Mrs.
Huntington should die leaving issue." Similar holdings have not
been infrequent; 17 but they do not help us, for they concern a
remainder to a person certain upon an event uncertain, while
we are interested in a remainder to a person uncertain upon an
event certain.
In several cases, the assignment by a contingent remainder-
man has been enforced in equity as an agreement of sale. 8 In
other cases, the matter has been altered by statute." One or two
cases, with little or no discussion, hold that any contingent re-
mainder is assignable at common law, without depending upon
any change or development in the law, 20 but these cases are
clearly against the weight of authority, which holds that the quit-
claim deed of a contingent remainderman conveys nothing.2 1
One case put the matter on the basis of the intent of the parties,
construed the deed there considered as intended to pass a fee
simple, and so gave effect thereto, though the grantor had only a
16 87 Conn. 517, 89 Atl. 205 (1913).
17 Havens v. Sea Shore Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, 20 Atl. 497 (1890);
Robinson v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 75 Misc. 361, 133 N. Y. Supp.
257 (Sup. Ct. 1912); see Dickson v. Dickson, 23 S. C. 216, 225 (1885),
where it is said: "Where the existence of the remainderman himself at the
time of the event upon which the remainder is to take effect does not con-
stitute the contingency, then the remainder is transmissible;" cf. Schapiro
v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 78 At]. 58 (1910), which held that even then
the remainder was assignable only in equity.
28 Allston v. Bank, 2 Hill Eq. 235 (S. C. 1835); Bayler v. Common-
wealth, 40 Pa. 37 (1861); Bailey v. Hoppin, 12 R. I. 560 (1880); Wilcox
v. Daniels, 15 R. I. 261, 3 Atl. 204 (1885).
19 Robeson v. Cochran, 255 Ill. 355, 99 N. E. 649 (1912); Lackland v.
Nevins, 3 Mo. App. 335 (1877); McDonald v. Bank, 123 Iowa 413, 98 N.
W. 1025 (1904).
20 Brown v. Fulkerson, 125 Mo. 400, 28 S. W. 632 (1894); Earle v.
Maxwell, 86 S. C. 1, 67 S. E. 962 (1910), holding that a contingent remainder
was "'property"' which "the bankrupt 'could by any means have trans-
ferred'" and so passed to his trustee.
21 Dart v. Dart, 7 Conn. 250 (1828) (a quitclaim deed held to pass only
what the grantor then had); Smith v. Pendell, supra note 14; Robeson
v. Cochran,.supra note 19; Read v. Fogg, 60 Me. 479 (1872); Robertson
v. Wilson, 38 N. H. 48 (1859) ("A contingent remainder is not an interest
that can be conveyed by deed, operating at the time of the conveyance on
an existing estate, or that can be taken for debt under legal process");
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contingent remainder.2 The cases agree that the remainder can
be conveyed by a warranty deed or other deed operating by way
of estoppel,2- and that it can be released to the particular tenant
in possession.Y-
However conclusive these authorities might be in bringing a
court to decide a case of first impression in favor of the assign-
ability of contingent remainders, there certainly is not sufficient
trend of authority, based on the development of the common law
to suit modern conditions, to bring about, in Connecticut, a rever-
sal of the opinion in Smith v. Peizdell.
But apart from authority, what is the intention of the parties
to a survivorship deed? What do they intend to get out of it?
And how far have the courts been willing to go to effectuate
such intention?
An intimate relationship among the grantees is the almost
invariable concomitant of a survivorship deed. A diversified
interest is extremely rarely, if ever, to be found. This clearly
indicates that the reason for creating such an estate must arise
out of some incident of the relationship. The purpose seems
to be to make a mutual provision, by pooling of present resources,
for the future of both grantees. If the tenancy were one in com-
mon between the same individuals, the probability is very strong
that each tenant would be the natural object of the other's
bounty-potentially the chief beneficiary under any will which
the other might make.
Each grantee, therefore, has paid an aliquot portion of the
purchase price of the land in order that both might enjoy its
use and benefit while both should live; and in order that, upon
the decease of one, the other might have full ownership and use
without necessity for intervention of the probate court, with its
attendant delay and expense. Because of the relationship to that
survivor, the first to die has been willing to advance half the
price upon the chance that that other, rather than himself, should
receive the major benefit.
But has either tenant advanced half the price in order that
some third person may gamble on the length of the lives of the
co-tenants, and benefit by the decease of one? Will any one claim
that a grantee, or creditor, of his co-tenant has entered into his
"sorry scheme of things entire" when he advanced such value
Hall v. Nute, 38 N. H. 422 (1859); Hayes v. Tabor, 41 N. H. 521 (1860);
Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309, 20 Atl. 1002 (1891); see Roundtrce v.
Roundtree, 26 S. C. 450, 471 (1886).
22 Hannon v. Christopher, 34 N. J. Eq. 459 (1881).
23Read v. Fogg; Robertson v. Wilson; Hayes v. Tabor; Stewart v.
Neely, all supra note 21.
24 Smith v. Pendell, supra note 14; Bartholomew v. Muzzy, upra note
5; Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Barb. 328 (N. Y. 1860); McDonald v. Bank, -upra
note 19.
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and took an estate of such precarious duration? In such state
of affairs, could either grantee have intended that the other
should have a transmissible, attachable interest in the res before
the final devolution of the estate upon one or the other owner?
Has either grantee contemplated a co-tenancy with any person
other than his co-tenant in survivorship? The intent being clear,
there remains only the question of how far the courts will go in
effectuating it.
The astuteness of the Connecticut court to ascertain and
carry out the intent of parties to deeds is illustrated by the early
case of Bryan v. Bradley,25 an admirably reasoned opinion. Still
more convincing proof is found in the treatment of estates in
fee tail, which present the same question of transmissibility.
The Connecticut statute transforms estates in fee tail into estates
in fee simple in the issue of the first donee,20 yet the court has
consistently held that the issue of the donee in tail had only
an estate by limitation, giving them no interest which would be
attachable, alienable or transmissible during the life time of the
donee in tail,27 thus leaving the ultimate fee simple in suspense,
contrary to the established policy of all courts. The decisions,
in a few words, base this rule upon the theory that the words
"and to the heirs of his body" are words purely of limitation,
rather than of purchase. Yet, if we go further back than these
decisions, we find the controlling spirit back of them to be a
desire to carry out the intent of the parties. We again quote
Swift 28 to demonstrate this, the Connecticut statute mentioned
above having been in force at the time he wrote:
"It has ever been a great object to secure a provision for
unborn children. . . .But in this State, such an object can be ac-
complished in a much shorter method [than by "strict settle-
ment," as in England]. As we give to the issue of the first
donee in tail, an estate in fee simple, and do not permit the first
donee himself to break the entailment by fine or recovery, or
any other mode, we enable the owner of an estate, by making
use of words proper to create an estate in fee tail, to create an
estate of as long duration as can be made in England, or by our
law; and which can not be defeated by the tenant in tail. The
grant to a man, and the heirs of his body, as effectually secures
2516 Conn. 474 (1844).
20 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5082.
27 Dart v. Dart, supra note 21; Comstock v. Gay, 51 Conn. 45 (1883);
St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. '401, 34 At]. 110 (1895); cf. Davis v. Hayden,
9 Mass. 514 (1813).
2S Swift has been frequently quoted at the risk of the charge-so ready
upon the tongue of modern lawyers-of reliance upon too ancient authority.
Yet Swift is still frequently quoted by the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors and his work is so intimately entwined with Connecticut tradition,
setting forth so clearly the common law as developed there that his work
is still important and enlightening in any study of the general law of
Connecticut. See citation of Swift in Clover v. Urban, 108 Conn. 13, 17, 142
At]. 389, 390 (1928).
SURVIVORSHIP DEEDS
the estate to his unborn children by our law, as it can be done
in England, by granting an estate to a man for life, remainder to
his unborn children, with trustees to preserve contingent re-
mainders." 29
In practical effect, a grant to a man and to the heirs of his
body, as affected by the Connecticut statute, creates an estate
for life with contingent remainder to the heirs of his body. If
the courts have not found it subversive of public policy to per-
mit such an isolation of property in this case, upon what ground
can we expect a different decision in the case of survivorship
tenancy, a joint life estate with contingent remainder over? It
is believed that with this additional ground upon which to rely
it will be found, when necessary to decide, that a tenant in sur-
vivorship cannot convey his interest, except for his own lifetime,
by quitclaim deed to a third party, and that Smtzth v. Pa 1 dedl
is still good law.
As to the rights of creditors of the respective co-tenants in
Connecticut, there is less need for prediction. In Smiztli 2.
Gilbert," decided in 1898, a testator gave land to his wife for
life, with remainder to two sons; but if either son predeceased
the widow, leaving issue, the issue were to take his share. Pend-
ing settlement of the estate and during the life of the widow,
the plaintiff attached the interest of one son. It was held that
the plaintiff secured nothing by his attachment, in either real
or personal estate. We quote the headnote of the case:
"Public policy forbids that an interest in property, real or
personal, which is so remote, contingent and of uncertain value
that it cannot be fairly appraised or sold on execution, should
be open to attachment; nor do the statutes of this State author-
ize the attachment of such an interest."
In the opinion it is said:
"It is the purpose of our law that no estate in land can be
taken on execution, unless at its 'true value! " 31
Yet how much more susceptible of appraisal was the interest
of the son in this case than the interest of a tenant in survivor-
ship, which may prove to be worth less than one month's rent, or
to be worth the full value of the land! Certainly public policy
in Connecticut has not so altered in a scant thirty years as to
prevent this case from controlling the rights of tenants in sur-
vivorship, and preserving them from attachment and execution,
and, a fortiori, from judgment lien.
The carelessness of scriveners forces us to a consideration of a
29 1 SwIFT, op. cit. supra note 3, at side page 98.
30 Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 At. 284 (1S98).
31 Ibid. 155, 41 Atl. 284, 286.
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final aspect of our subject. A typical example of the question to
be answered is found on page 302 in Volume 116 of the Land
Records of the Town of Hamden, Connecticut, where land was
deeded to a husband and wife, and the survivor of them; but
the habendum clause was to the grantees, their heirs and assigns.
What estates were thereby conveyed?
The common law rule was that in case of conflict between the
premises and the habendum the premises would control. The
reason for this was stated to be that the granting clause was
essential to the operation of the deed, the habendum was not;
so that the essential clause must necessarily control the super-
fluous. The Connecticut court has said, "It is in the premiscs
of.the deed that the thing is really granted." 32
This rule is very reasonable and satisfactory, provided there
is a real conflict, and has often been applied to its full extent.3
But the courts have later come to realize that what seems at first
to be a repugnance is not in fact such, in which case the intention,
gathered from the whole deed, is given effect, all in recognizing
the rule itself.4 Thus, where the grant was to A and his heirs,
habendum to A during his lifetime and at his death to be equally
divided among his heirs, it was held that the whole deed revealed
an intent to give A a life use, with remainder over." And a
similar effect was given to the habendum in a case where the
deed was to A, her heirs and assigns; to have and to hold unto
A, "for and during the natural life, only, of her, the said A, with
remainder in fee simple to the heirs of the body of the said A,
her surviving, and, in default of such heirs, then remainder in
fee simple to all other heirs of said A." 31 In both these cases,
the habendum was not repugnant to the premises; it simply ex-
plained them, showing what estate was to go to A and what
estate to A's heirs. Thus, in Missouri, where words of inheri-
tance are not needed in order to create a fee simple, it was held,
32 Manning v. Smith, 6 Conn. 289, 292 (1826), per Hosmer, C. 3.
3 Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Miss. 698, 31 So. 341 (1901); Blackwell v.
Blackwell, 124 N. C. 269, 32 S. E. 676 (1899); Ratliffe v. Ratliffe, 182
Ky. 230, 206 S. W. 478 (1918); Land v. Land, 172 Ky. 145, 189 S. W. 1
(1916); Smith v. Smith, 71 Mich. 633, 40 N. W. 21 (1888); Adams v.
Dunklee, 19 Vt. 382 (1847); Deering v. Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51 (1845);
Ratliffe v. Marrs, 87 Ky. 26, 7 S. W. 395 (1888);, Winter v. Gorsuch, 51
Md. 180 (1878); Hafner v. Irwin, 20 N. C. 433 (1839); Gaddes v. Paw-
tucket Institution for Savings, 33 R. I. 177, 80 Atl. 415 (1911).
34 Combs v. Fields, 211 Ky. 842, 278 S. W. 137 (1925); Powers v. Hib-
bard, 114 Mich. 533, V/ N. W. 339 (1897); Basset v. Budlong, 77 Mich.
338, 43 N. W. 984 (1889); Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 73, 89 N. W. 566
(1902); Bodine v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53, 14 S. W. 904 (1890); Baskett v.
Sellars, 93 Ky. 2, 19 S. W. 9 (1892); Singleton v. School District, 10 S. W.
793 (Ky. 1889).
35 Combs v. Fields, supra note 34.
36 Wilson v. Terry, supra "not'e 34.
614
SURVIVORSHIP DEEDS
under a grant to A with habendum to A and hi: bodily heirs,
that a fee tail had been granted, there being no real repugniance.
Occasionally a conflict is resolved upon the ground that clear
language cannot be controlled by less clear and decisive words.
Thus, a grant to A, with request that X have it upon A's decease,
was held to pass a fee simple to A.31 Again, importance was
given to the habendum-in a case where there were previous
clauses in conflict with each other-in determining which con-
struction to adopt.-" Similarly, where the premises were silent as
to the estate granted, resort was had to the habendum.10 In one
case, a deed with grant to A and the heirs of his body, to have
and to hold unto A, his heirs and assigns, was held to pass a
fee tail upon three grounds: first, because the habendum must
yield to the premises in cases of repugnance; second, because
words of general limitation must yield to words of special limi-
tation; and third, because the intent gathered from the whole
deed must be effectuated.41
Any one of the theories set forth in these citations, if applied
to our case, would achieve the same result. If the premises are
to control, an estate in survivorship has been created. If we
take the habendum to be simply an explanation of the premises,
we must understand it as explaining the intention of the grantor
to divest himself of a fee simple estate which should pass to the
grantees and the survivor of them. If we are to take the clear
language as controlling, the words in the premises, being in de-
tail of the estate granted, are of superior clarity. There are
no previous repugnances to be resolved, and so we need not
resort to the habendum for that reason. The premises certainly
are not silent -as to the estate granted. And if we give pre-
dominance to the words of special, rather than general, limita-
tion, we must again take the premises as controlling. As to the
intent gathered from the whole deed, we must either construe
the deed to create a survivorship, or else treat the double mention
of the survivor as surplusage-an unreasonable interpretation.
Whichever theory we adopt, the estate is a survivorship ten-
ancy.
The practical cause of the frequency of this question of re-
pugnance between premises and habendum itself gives a
reasonable basis for construction. In most of the cases where
this error is made, the deed is drawn by filling out a stationer's
blank, with the habendum printed in full except for the pro-
nouns preceding the words "heirs and assigns." But the grant-
3 Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284, 70 S. V. 702 (1902).
38 Wolverton v. Hoffman, 104 Va. 605, 52 S. E. 176 (1905).
39 Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186 (1872).
40 Havens v. Sea Shore Land Co., supra note 17.
41 Hunter v. Patterson, 142 Mo. 310, 44 S. W. 250 (1898).
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ing words must be written out in full, and, for this reason, are
most apt to express the true intent of the parties. This aid to
construction has be~n adopted in at least one case, where a deed
was made to A, during her life, to have and to hold unto A, her
heirs and , igns. The court recognized the rule of the common
law, in cas 'f irreconcilable conflict, and further said:
"The woru. 'during her life,' as here employed, must be held to
mean just what they say, and vest the grantee with an estate
during her life only. As the habendum clause is in the regular
form generally found in printed deed blanks, the conflict between
it and the granting clause may be attributed to the fact that
the draftsman of the deed used such a printed blank form in
the preparation of the instrument." 42
In cases where the grant is in survivorship, with habendum
to the heirs and assigns of the grantees, the title offices in Con-
necticut have declined to certify to the title of the surviving
tenant, but -ave, out of their abundant caution, demanded a deed
from the r -esentatives of the deceased tenant. This seems
unnecessary. a view of the authorities. A careful examination
of the decisions fails to reveal one upon which the heirs of the
deceased tenant could base a reasonable case. The title offices
would seem to be entirely safe in certifying to the title of the
survivor in such cases, in spite of the fact that as yet there is
no decision in Connecticut directly on the point.
42 Grainger v. Edwards, 190 Ky. 408, 410, 227 S. W. 661 (1921).
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